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Common Law Intellectual Property and the
Legacy of International News Service v.
Associated Press
Douglas G. Bairdt

That information once published should be presumptively free
for all to use is a commonplace of intellectual property law. As
Benjamin Kaplan has observed, "if man has any 'natural' rights,
not the least must be a right to imitate his fellows, and thus to
reap where he has not sown. Education, after all, proceeds from a
kind of mimicry, and 'progress,' if it is not entirely an illusion, depends on generous indulgence of copying."1 It might thus seem to
follow that judges should have only modest powers to find that individuals have common law intellectual property rights. Common
law judges, however, often discover such rights under the branch of
unfair competition law known as misappropriation.
In this paper, I reexamine the common law doctrine of misappropriation and argue that, contrary to the fears of Brandeis,
Hand, Kaplan, and others, the doctrine has flourished in the state
courts without impeding the free flow of information. I go on, however, to argue that the task of discovering new coion law intellectual property rights is extraordinarily difficult because it requires grappling with first principles. The danger lurking in the
common law development of intellectual property rights is not, as
some have suggested, that judges will embrace an unsound naturalrights theory of intellectual property, for in practice relatively little
turns on the choice of an underlying theory. Rather, the danger is
that judges will fail to identify the interest for which protection is
being urged and hence fail to discover the intellectual property
cases that provide the most useful analogies.

t Assistant Professor of Law, University of Chicago. I thank Frank Easterbrook, Gerald
Gunther, Thomas Jackson, William Landes, John Langbein, Phil Neal, Geoffrey Stone, Cass
Sunstein, and Robert Weisberg for their help. I also am grateful to Norris Darrell, Erika
Chadbourn, and the Harvard Law School Library for permitting me to use the Learned
Hand papers.
I B. KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 2 (1966).
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CASE

The misappropriation doctrine was first developed in International News Service v. Associated Press' by the Supreme Court.
That case arose during World War I, when British censors barred
the Hearst news service, INS, from sending cables about the war to
the United States.3 To provide news about the war to its member
newspapers, INS bought early east coast editions of newspapers
published by subscribers to the Associated Press ("AP"), paraphrased the war news, and sent the stories to its own newspapers.
Because some INS newspapers on the west coast came out before
rival AP newspapers in the same cities, INS newspapers sometimes
reported war news before those served by AP.4 AP had not copyrighted its stories and could not rely on federal statutory
protection. 5
Justice Pitney, writing for the Court, found that the Associated Press had a "quasi-property" interest in the news that it
gathered that gave it the right to prevent a competitor from using
it. He reasoned that
[t]he right of the purchaser of a single newspaper to spread
knowledge of its contents gratuitously, for any legitimate purpose not unreasonably interfering with [AP's] right to make
merchandise of it, may be admitted; but to transmit that news
for commerical use, in competition with [AP] . . . is a very
different matter. In doing this [INS], by its very act, admits
that it is taking material that has been acquired by [AP] as
the result of organization and the expenditure of labor, skill,
and money, and which is salable by [API for money, and that
[INS] in appropriating it and selling it as its own is endeavoring to reap where it has not sown . . . . The transaction
speaks for itself, and a court of equity ought not to hesitate
long in characterizing it as unfair competition in business.6

2

248 U.S. 215 (1918) (hereinafter referred to as the INS case).

See E. KrTCH & H.
(2d ed. 1979).
3

PERLMAN, LEGAL REGULATION OF THE COMPETITrIVE PROCESS

33-34

248 U.S. at 238-39.
Copyright protection was difficult to retain, because any publication without notice by
any of AP's subscribers would have resulted in a forfeiture of copyright. See Holmes v.
Hurst, 174 U.S. 82 (1899). Moreover, because copyright protects only original expression,
rather than facts or ideas themselves, see 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (Supp. V 1981), it is not clear
that AP could have prevented INS from paraphrasing its news, even if it had gone through
the requisite statutory formalities.
1 248 U.S. at 239-40.
4

"
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INS did not tell the public that its news was in fact AP's, and the
subscribers to INS papers may have mistakenly thought that INS
had gathered the news it was reporting. Justice Pitney, however,
made it clear that AP would have had a cause of action regardless
of whether INS fully disclosed the source of its news.7 INS engaged
in unfair competition quite apart from whether INS passed off its
news as something it was not or whether it deceived the public in
any way. The unfairness of INS's conduct lay in taking AP's information and not paying for it.
That an individual has the right to reap what he has sown,
however, is far from self-evident even as applied to tangible property. We cannot talk intelligibly about an individual's rights until
we have established a set of entitlements. We typically can reap
only the wheat we sow on our own land, and how land becomes
private property in the first place remains a mystery.8 In any
event, wheat and information are fundamentally different from one
another. It is the nature of wheat or land or any other tangible
property that possession by one person precludes possession by
anyone else. A court must decide that A should get the wheat or
that B should get the wheat. It cannot decide that both get all of
it. Many people, however, can use the same piece of information.'
Millions can watch the same television program without interfering
with one another.
The value of the information to AP derived in part from its
ability to keep its rivals from copying the information it gathered.
But deciding that it could not enjoy its news exclusively is not the
same as telling a farmer he must hand over wheat he has grown to
someone who merely watched him grow it. Deciding against AP
would not mean that it would lose all revenue from its news-gathering efforts. People would still pay for the AP's news, and its
rights would be entirely unaffected in the towns that the AP
served exclusively.
That the analogy between wheat and information does not apply with full force, however, does not mean that it should not apply at all. One can still argue that individuals have the right to
enjoy the fruits of their labors, even when the labors are intellecat 241-42.
9 Compare Hamilton, Property-Accordingto Locke, 41 YALE L.J. 864 (1932) with Epstein, Possession as the Root of Title, 13 GA. L. REv. 1221 (1979).
' Information comes close to being a public good, as an economist uses the term. See
Demsetz, The Private Productionof Public Goods, 13 J.L. & ECON. 293 (1970). This is not
to say, of course, that information can be used at no cost. See Stigler, An Introduction to
Privacy in Economics and Politics, 9 J. LE.AL STUD. 623, 640-41 (1980).
7Id.
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tual. But granting individuals exclusive rights to the information
they gather conflicts with other rights in a way that granting exclusive rights to tangible property does not. In a market economy,
granting individuals exclusive rights to property is an effective way
of allocating scarce resources. 10 Saying that someone should be
able to own a particular good or piece of land and should be able
to keep others from getting it unless they pay him is unobjectionable once one accepts the desirability of a market economy. Granting exclusive rights to information does not, however, necessarily
promote a market economy. Competition depends upon imitation.
One person invests labor and money to create a product, such as a
food processor, that people will buy. Others may imitate him and
take advantage of the new market by selling their own food processors. Their machines may incorporate their own ideas about how
such machines should be made. As a result, the quality of the machines may rise and their price may fall. The first person is made
worse off than he would be if he had had an exclusive right to his
idea, because his competitors are enjoying the fruits of his labor
and are not paying for it. Nevertheless, the public as a whole may
be better off, as long as this freedom to imitate does not destroy
the incentive for people to come up with new devices."
10See Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. EcoN. REV. 347 (1967).

" The headstart the inventor has on the competition is thought sufficient reward unless
the invention is new, nonobvious, and useful. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 (1976). In Graham v.
John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 9 (1966), the Court observed:
The patent monopoly was not designed to secure to the inventor his natural right in his
discoveries. Rather, it was a reward, an inducement, to bring forth new knowledge. The
grant of an exclusive right to an invention was the creation of society-at odds with the
inherent free nature of disclosed ideas-and was not to be freely given. Only inventions
and discoveries which furthered human knowledge, and were new and useful, justified
the special inducement of a limited private monopoly.
See also Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248, 267 (1851) ("[U]nless more ingenuity and skill . . . were required . . . than were possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business, there was an absence of that degree of skill and ingenuity which
constitute essential elements of every invention.").
Justice Brandeis captured this view in Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111,
122 (1938):
[The defendant was] sharing in a market which was created by the skill and judgment
[of] the plaintiff's predecessor and has been widely extended by vast expenditures in
advertising persistently made. But that is not unfair. Sharing in the goodwill of an
article unprotected by patent or trade-mark is the exercise of a right possessed by
all-and in the free exercise of which the consuming public is deeply interested.
Whether the existing patent system works effectively or whether the standard for patentability should be significantly lower (or higher) than it is now is a subject of considerable
academic debate for which there is no clear answer. Compare Hirshleifer, The Private and
Social Value of Information and the Reward to Inventive Activity, 61 Am. EcoN. Rv. 561
(1971) with Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & EcoN. 265
HeinOnline -- 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 414 1983
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More generally, all of us take constant advantage of the information others gather and the ideas others create. Few of us use a
language of our own creation, yet none of us pays a royalty to
speak it. We think ideas and information should be presumptively
free for all to use. 12 That the labor theory of intellectual property
comes upon a competing principle does not, however, say that it
should not be given some scope. Moreover, Justice Pitney did not
rely simply on the theory that individuals have a natural right to
the fruits of their labor. He also noted that the public interest in
the news itself was served by recognizing AP's rights, for granting
AP a quasi-property right gave AP the incentive to invest millions
of dollars in news gathering, and everyone could enjoy the benefit
of those efforts merely by paying a few cents for the morning
paper.1 3
II.

MISAPPROPRIATION DOCTRINE AND ITS CRITICS

It is useful to examine misappropriation doctrine in the light
of other intellectual property regimes. The federal system of intellectual property derives from the clause of the Constitution that
gives Congress the power to give authors and inventors exclusive
rights to their writings and discoveries for a limited time for the
14
purpose of promoting "the Progress of Science and useful Arts.'
Individuals are given a limited property right, not so much because
they are morally deserving, but because providing them with such
a right is thought necessary to induce them to produce the work in
the first instance. Both copyright and patent law balance the need
to provide authors and inventors with incentives against the need
for free access to what has been produced. 5
(1977).

12Many,

for example, might be surprised to learn that we have to pay a royalty when

we sing "Happy Birthday to You" in public because the song is still subject to copyright
protection. See Salamon, On the Other Hand, You Can Blow Out ihe Candles for Free,
Wall St. J., June 12, 1981, at 1, col. 4. Copyright protection extends under the 1976 Act for
the writer's lifetime, plus 50 years, 17 U.S.C. § 302 (1976), and the holder of a copyright in a
musical composition has, among other things, the exclusive right to perform the work publicly, id. § 106(4) (Supp. V 1981).
This particular observation about the limitation of the labor theory of intellectual property-that it falls to account for the need that we have to take advantage of the intellectual
activity of others-is one that I have taken from elsewhere, yet few would suggest that I
should pay Brandeis, Hand, or Kaplan cash for a license to repeat it here.
Is248 U.S. at 235.

14U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8,cl. 8.
In Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954), the Court noted:
The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents
and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal
HeinOnline -- 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 415 1983
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Continental systems of intellectual property, in contrast, emphasize the importance of the individual artist's rights, quite apart
from whether giving such rights enhances public enjoyment of the
arts in the long run. Under French law, for example, an artist can
insist that his name be associated with his work whenever it is
published or displayed.1 6 The right is not justified on the grounds
that artists generally will produce more if they know their names
will be forever attached to their work (although it might have this
effect). Rather, the right is justified out of respect for the labors of
the individual artist.1 7 Although an artist's natural rights have
been at best an undercurrent in federal intellectual property law,18
the misappropriation doctrine of INS and its progeny have recognized them explicitly. Individuals are protected both because they
are deserving and because they serve the public's interest in the
production of information.
Apart from the problem of preemption, critics raise two major

gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in "Science and useful Arts." Sacrificial days devoted to such creative activities
deserve rewards commensurate with the services rendered.
Macaulay, speaking of the English copyright system, echoed this view in a speech delivered
in the House of Commons in 1841. See Macaulay, Copyright (pt. 1), in PROSE AND POETRY
731, 733-35 (G. Young ed. 1952):
The advantages arising from a system of copyright are obvious. It is desirable that
we should have a supply of good books: we cannot have such a supply unless men of
letters are liberally remunerated....
...
[T]he least exceptionable way of remunerating them is by a monopoly. Yet
monopoly is an evil. For the sake of the good we must submit to the evil; but the evil
ought not to last a day longer than is necessary for the purpose of securing the good.
16 E.g., Judgment of Nov. 15, 1966, Cour d'appel, Paris, 1967 Dalloz-Sirey, Jurisprudence 284; see Sarraute, Current Theory on the Moral Right of Authors and Artists Under
French Law, 16 AM. J. CoMP. L. 465, 478-80 (1968).
17 See Sarraute, supra note 16, at 465-66.
19 The rhetoric of federal law has relied largely on the incentive rationale, and many of
the law's features reflect this rationale. For example, failure to include notice of copyright
can result in forfeiture of the copyright. E.g., Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U.S. 82 (1899). Forfeiture provisions have been liberalized under the 1976 Copyright Act. See 17 U.S.C. § 405
(1976).
American law protects artists incidentally through copyright and patent law, contract
principles, and laws governing unfair competition. The Second Circuit, for example, relied
both on copyright law, contract rights, and § 43 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1976),
to enjoin the American Broadcasting Co. ("ABC") from mutilating television programs produced by Monty Python's Flying Circus. Gilliam v. ABC, 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976). Ken
Follett used § 43 to limit a publisher from representing him as the principal author of a
work he had largely translated. Follett v. New Am. Library, Inc., 497 F. Supp. 304 (S.D.N.Y.
1980). For an analysis of the ways in which the present Copyright Act protects the reputational interests of authors, see Note, An Author's Artistic Reputation Under the Copyright
Act of 1976, 92 HARv. L. REv. 1490 (1979).
HeinOnline -- 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 416 1983
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objections to state misappropriation doctrine. 19 First, they argue
that judges are poorly situated to identify the policies at stake in
an intellectual property dispute and that judges therefore should
not recognize intellectual property rights until the legislature has
done so. 20 Second, critics argue that the part of INS that is based
on the natural right of an individual to the fruits of his labor cannot be confined or easily reconciled with competing principles. 21
The argument that judges should not be in the business of creating intellectual property rights is based both on the general presumption that ideas, once published, should be free for all to use
and on the comparative advantage a legislature has in balancing
competing values. Given the importance of insuring the free flow of
ideas (regardless of which theory is embraced), it is crucial to ensure that the boundaries of whatever rights are established are, in
22
Brandeis's words, "definitely established and wisely guarded.
Moreover,
[c]ourts are ill-equipped to make the investigations which
should precede a determination of the limitations which
should be set upon any property right in news. . . . Courts
would be powerless to prescribe the detailed regulations essential to full enjoyment of the rights conferred or to introduce the machinery required for enforcement of such regulations. Considerations such as these should lead us to decline
to establish a new rule of law in the effort to redress a newlydisclosed wrong, although the propriety of some remedy ap3
pears to be clear.
A court's inability to resolve a dispute as well as a legislature
might, however, does not necessarily justify the court's refusal to
decide the issue.2 4 After all, refusing to recognize a cause of action
is ultimately no different from deciding in favor of the defendant.
More to the point, the type of standard that a legislature typically
establishes for an intellectual property right is often no more carefully hewn than is a court's. Indeed, many of the substantive provi1 In Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657, 667 (2d Cir. 1955)
(L. Hand, J., dissenting), Learned Hand voiced the further objection, related to the preemption argument, that different laws in each state would balkanize intellectual property law.
'o E.g., INS, 248 U.S. at 262-67 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
2 E.g., Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279, 280 (2d Cir. 1929), cert. denied,
281 U.S. 728 (1930).

INS, 248 U.S. at 263 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
, Id. at 267.
2 See 1 H. HART & A. SACKS, THs LEGAL PROCESS 546 (tent. ed. 1958).
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sions of both copyright law (such as the fair use defense2 5 ) and
patent law (such as the nonobviousness requirement26 ) are simply
codifications of principles that courts have developed over time.
Complicated rules and elaborate regulations are generally the
exceptions.
Judges, as well as academics, have thought that the expansive
reach of federal statutes has limited courts' freedom to invoke the
common law and that, even if it did not, courts should not exercise
their common law powers.2 8 But the Supreme Court's preemption
cases in intellectual property have taught us, to the extent they
have taught us anything, that there is a role for state law to play.29
Whether state courts, as opposed to state legislatures, should discover intellectual property rights by using their common law powers depends ultimately on one's faith in the ability of common law
courts to re-form and improve the law through incremental change,
and the degree to which one thinks that courts are obliged to decide as best they can all cases over which they have jurisdiction.
In the 1930's, the Second Circuit concluded that courts had
little license to discover intellectual property rights in the common
law.30 The court relied in part on the notion that the creation of
intellectual property rights was solely within the competence of the
legislature and in part on the preemptive scope of federal legislation. The Second Circuit also thought that the natural rights theory of INS cut much too broadly. These cases force us to ask if
recognizing the power of judges to discover intellectual property
rights can be based on anything other than a balancing of incentive
against free access.
In Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp.,31 Learned Hand faced a

25

17 U.S.C. § 107 (Supp. V 1981).
35 U.S.C. § 103 (1976).

= The least successful and most heavily criticized parts of the new copyright act are
the sections such as the one governing cable television, see 17 U.S.C. § 111 (1976), in which
Congress created elaborate regulations, largely as a result of lobbying by special interest
groups. See Goldstein, Preempted State Doctrines,Involuntary Transfers and Compulsory
Licenses: Testing the Limits of Copyright, 24 U.C.L.A. L. Rav. 1107, 1127-39 (1977).
28 See, e.g., Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279 (2d Cir. 1929), cert. denied,
281 U.S. 728 (1930); Goldstein, supra note 27.
2 See, e.g., Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257 (1979); Kewanee Oil Co. v.
Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974). For an analysis of the Supreme Court's preemption cases,
see Goldstein, Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.: Notes on a Closing Circle, 1974 SUP. CT.
REv. 81.
30 See, e.g., Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279 (2d Cir. 1929), cert. denied,
281 U.S. 728 (1930). These cases were decided under pre-Erie general federal common law.
See generally Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
W 35 F.2d 279 (2d Cir. 1929). For a discussion of Learned Hand's treatment of the INS
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set of defendants who had deliberately copied the dress designs of
the plaintiffs. Dress designs were not covered either by copyright
or design patent laws at the time. As in INS, the defendants in
Cheney had taken advantage of the efforts of the plaintiffs. Hand,
however, declined to extend INS to protect dress designers. He
thought that Congress itself had struck a balance between incentive and access, that the natural rights theory of INS had no limiting principle, and that once applied outside the facts of that case,
the INS doctrine would engulf all it touched and forbid many
forms of legitimate competition. 2 Such a conclusion may not have
seemed open to a lower federal court after INS, but Learned Hand
told other members of the panel in Cheney privately that although
INS "is somewhat of a stumbling block," and although "on principle it is hard to distinguish, and.

. .

the language applies, I cannot

suppose that any principle of such far-reaching consequence was
intended.""3
In his later opinions, Hand did not elaborate; he simply cited
Cheney for the proposition that INS was to be narrowly construed
and repeated his basic belief that artists had no "natural right" to
their efforts, but only those rights given them by the legislature.3 4
Others on the Second Circuit shared Hand's reluctance to apply
INS, a reluctance they admitted freely to one another. For example, when deliberating the merits in RCA Manufacturing Co. v.
Whiteman,"3 Judge Clark observed to Hand that "[i]n principle,
this case is entirely indistinguishable from International News
Service v. A.P.... and we might as well admit it. But we have
conquered the News case before; it can be done again." s
The fears of Hand and others seem well-taken. It is more than
a little distressing to find in many of the opinions that adopt natural rights theory a statement to the effect that "[t]he controlling
doctrine, see Goldstein, Federal System Ordering of the Copyright Interest, 69 COLUM. L.
REv. 49, 51-62 (1969).
32 35 F.2d at 280.
33Memorandum from Learned Hand to Martin T. Manton & Thomas W. Swann 2
(Oct. 8, 1929) (Learned Hand Papers, Harvard Law School Library).
34 See, e.g., RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S.
712 (1940).
31 Id. In Whiteman, a performer unsuccessfully asserted that he could prevent radios
from broadcasting his records by placing a restrictive legend on them. The Second Circuit
rejected the performer's claim that the legend was enforceable as an equitable servitude.
Copyright law did not (and in fact still does not) give a performer the right to control radio
broadcasts of his performances.
31 Memorandum from Charles E. Clark to Learned Hand & Robert P. Patterson 3
(June 21, 1940) (Learned Hand Papers, Harvard Law School Library).
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question . . . is whether the commercial practice at issue is fair or
unfair.""7 If the only limit on the plaintiff's right were whether or
not the grant of relief would be fair, judges would have little guidance other than their own subjective perceptions of what was good.
This objection to the natural rights principle of INS, however, may
prove too much. Judges are routinely asked to balance competing
interests against one another. Against the natural rights theory of
intellectual property one has to balance the need to keep ideas
flowing freely and to keep competition alive generally. Striking this
balance may be no more difficult or subjective than weighing the
considerations embodied in federal intellectual property law: the
need to give the gatherer of information an incentive against the
countervailing need to give the public free access to ideas.
To say that judges can use a natural rights theory is not to say
that an intellectual property regime based upon it is preferable to
one based upon a balance between incentive and free access. One
must first identify the differences between the two theories and
determine how important those differences may be. A natural
rights theory seems broader and less focused and puts more weight
on the worth of the individual creator and the behavior of the copier, but I would argue that these differences do not, in practice,
affect the way judges decide cases.
If judges focus on protecting the rights of the creator of information, more turns on the facts of an individual case, and the competing values that are being balanced are less clear. The more the
putative infringer seems to be acting in bad faith (the more, for
example, deception of the public accompanies the misappropriation), the more likely the individual plaintiff is to succeed.38 In
such cases, concerns about free access are apt to be dormant. In
INS itself, a decision in favor of AP might have kept some members of the public from having ready access to news about the war
because some towns were served only by INS and not by the AP.
These differences, however, are easy to exaggerate and often
may be rhetorical. In copyright disputes, attention to the relationship between the two parties is also important. The plaintiff must
prove that his work was in fact copied by the defendant and that
37 E.g., Board of Trade v. Dow Jones & Co., 108 I. App. 3d 681, 697, 439 N.E.2d 526,
537 (1982); Fisher v. Star Co., 231 N.Y. 414, 427, 132 N.E. 133, 137, cert. denied, 257 U.S.
654 (1921); see also Madison Square Garden Corp. v. Universal Pictures Co., 255 A.D. 459,
464-65, 7 N.Y.S.2d 845, 853 (1938).
See, e.g., Saratoga Vichy Spring Co. v. Lehman, 625 F.2d 1037, 1044 (2d Cir. 1980)

(asserting that some element of bad faith is central to a misappropriation action).
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the defendant did not come upon the same artistic expression independently.-9 Deception of the public is itself not relevant in a
copyright action, but when there is deception a copyright 40action is
combined with one under section 43 of the Lanham Act.
Similarly, even though the concern with free access lies dormant under a natural rights theory, courts seem sensitive to it and
rarely restrict a copier when the public lacks alternative access to
the information. In INS itself, towns may have been without AP's
news only because the local newspapers were not willing to pay AP
for the cost of providing it to them. Balancing between the rights
of the creator and the copier or between incentive and free access
is necessarily approximate, and the differences between protecting
a creator's individual rights and giving him an incentive or between imposing limits on a natural rights theory and ensuring public access are elusive. Rarely will the case arise the outcome of
which turns on the principle the judge embraces. A court might
feel that a plaintiff such as AP should be given relief both because
of its right to enjoy the fruits of its labor and because without the
right it will lack the incentive to gather as much information. A
principle as general and all-encompassing as the one announced in
INS seems to accommodate both ideas more comfortably than
would a principle based solely on a balancing of incentive and free
access, but such balancing is not very confining either.
The history of INS in the courts over the last sixty-five years
shows that it has not, as some feared, been a persistent heresy that
has engulfed all it touched. The case has been cited for the general
proposition that courts have the equitable power to do what is fair,
but these cases typically invoke INS in dictum simply as a rhetorical flourish and are usually well-founded upon a simple passing off
or unfair trade practice of one variety or another. 1 Courts have
usually rejected claims based on a misappropriation theory in cases
in which plaintiffs have tried to claim exclusive rights in an unpatentable device.'2
INS has served as the basis for protection of information a
31 See Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 53-54 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 669 (1936).
'0 See, e.g., Gilliam v. ABC, 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976); see also supra note 18.
41 E.g., Warner Bros. v. Gay Toys, Inc., 658 F.2d 76, 80 (2d Cir. 1981); Electrolux Corp.
v. Val-Worth, Inc., 6 N.Y.2d 556, 567, 161 N.E.2d 197, 203, 190 N.Y.S.2d 977, 986 (1959).
42 E.g., Addressograph-Multigraph Corp. v. American Expansion Bolt & Mfg. Co., 124
F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 682 (1942); Clipper Belt Lacer Co. v. Detroit
Belt Lacer Co., 223 Mich. 399, 194 N.W. 125 (1923). But see Meyer v. Hurwitz, 5 F.2d 370
(E.D. Pa. 1925).
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plaintiff has gathered, but courts have not used it as a license to
cut rough justice wherever they find competitive practices they do
not like. Many of the cases that have cited INS, for example, have
simply reaffirmed its holding as applied to similar facts.4" These
cases sometimes arise when a radio station forgoes subscribing to a
news service, buys a copy of a local newspaper, and then paraphrases it over the air.44 Other cases involve specialized trade papers that carry information to a specialized market, such as a
newsletter about new construction targeted at those in the building
industry.4 5 Another subset of cases invoking INS involved record
piracy, 46 an area in which states, before the Sound Recordings Act
of 1971,4 could create intellectual property rights without upsetting any congressional balance. 48 The protection against record
piracy these cases established was largely identical to the protection Congress itself eventually provided.4 9 In other areas, such as
the right of publicity, courts relied upon INS only until these new
50
rights acquired their own separate identity.
Whatever freedom state judges (or federal judges looking to
state law) have to create intellectual property under misappropriation doctrine is constrained by the preemptive effect of federal law
and the first amendment, which limit the amount of mischief that
INS can create. For example, federal preemption prevents states
from protecting what is unpatentable. A state judge could not protect the makers of Coca-Cola from competitors if their formula became public knowledge. 1 In any event, courts have largely conSee Denicola, Copyright in Collections of Facts: A Theory for the Protection of
Nonfiction Literary Works, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 516, 517 n.7 (1981); Mitchell, Misappropriation and the New Copyright Act: An Overview, 10 GOLDEN GATE L. REv. 587, 596 (1980).
", E.g., AP v. KVOS, Inc., 80 F.2d 575 (9th Cir. 1935), rev'd for want of juris., 299 U.S.
269 (1936); Veatch v. Wagner, 116 F. Supp. 904 (D. Alaska 1953); Pottstown Daily News
Publishing Co. v. Pottstown Broadcasting Co., 411 Pa. 383, 192 A.2d 657 (1963).
"I E.g., McCord Co. v. Plotnick, 108 Cal. App. 2d 392, 239 P.2d 32 (1951); Bond Buyer
v. Dealers Digest Publishing Co., 25 A.D.2d 158, 267 N.Y.S.2d 944 (1966); Gilmore v. Sammons, 269 S.W. 861 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925).
46 E.g., Capitol Records, Inc. v. Erickson, 2 Cal. App. 3d 526, 82 Cal. Rptr. 798 (1969),
cert. denied, 398 U.S. 960 (1970); Capitol Records, Inc. v. Spies, 130 IlM.App. 2d 429, 264
N.E.2d 874 (1970); Capitol Records, Inc. v. Greatest Records, Inc., 43 Misc. 2d 878, 252
N.Y.S.2d 553 (1964).
' Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 392 (current version in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
46 See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 551-52, 571 (1973).
4 See id. at 552-70.
60 E.g., Madison Square Garden Corp. v. Universal Pictures Co., 255 A.D. 459, 7
N.Y.S.2d 845 (1938).
6' See Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964); Sears, Roebuck &
Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
The reach of federal preemption in practice, however, should not be overstated. One
43
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fined INS to its original facts and to areas of law in which new
intellectual property principles have developed and have subsequently been recognized as legitimate by Congress or the Supreme
Court.
III.

MISAPPROPRIATION AND THE PROBLEM OF STOCK MARKET
INDICES

To this point, I have argued that in cases in which Congress
has left states free to create intellectual property rights, state
courts may legitimately discover such rights using their common
law powers, either by drawing upon the federal model, which balances incentive and free access, or by drawing upon a theory of
natural rights. In the rest of this paper, I want to comment on the
dangers that courts face when they embark upon this course.
These dangers are, I argue, quite distinct from the choice between
a natural rights and an economic incentive theory. As different in
their normative underpinnings as these two theories are, they need
not pose great practical problems. They typically point the common law judge in the same direction. The principal difficulties lie
elsewhere. I illustrate these difficulties by looking at a recent Second Circuit decision that relied on INS. In that case, the Second
Circuit upheld a preliminary injunction that prevented the Commodity Exchange from creating a market for futures contracts
based on the Standard & Poor's 500 Index ("S&P 500").52

The threshold question in the case of stock market indices, as
in other common law intellectual property disputes, is the preemptive effect of federal copyright and patent law. The Copyright Act
of 1976 addresses the preemption problem in section 301, 5 but the
state court, for example, found that a distributor had a right to prevent someone else from
reproducing his uncopyrighted film, on the grounds that what was at issue was "misappropriation," not mere "copying." Flamingo Telefilm Sales, Inc. v. United Artists Corp., 141
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 461 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), rev'd on other grounds, 22 A.D.2d 778, 254 N.Y.S.2d
36 (1964). The evolution of the elusive distinction between misappropriation and copying is
traced in Note, The "Copying-Misappropriation"Distinction:A False Step in the Development of the Sears-Compco Pre-emptionDoctrine, 71 COLUM. L. Rav. 1444 (1971).
52 Standard & Poor's Corp. v. Commodity Exch., Inc., 683 F.2d 704 (2d Cir. 1982). For
a general introduction to stock market indices, see J. Loam & M. HAMLTON, THE STOCK
MARKET 51-69 (1973). A futures contract based on such a market index typically takes the
form of an agreement between a "buyer" and a "seller." The buyer promises to pay the
seller a certain fixed sum some months hence in return for the seller's promise to pay the
buyer an amount based on the prevailing value of the index at that time. The buyer is

essentially betting that the market will rise and the seller is betting that it will fall. The
loser of the wager pays the other the difference between the predicted value of the index

and the actual value.

53 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
HeinOnline -- 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 423 1983

The University of Chicago Law Review

[50:411

freedom of state courts (or federal courts looking to state law) to
follow INS remains unclear.5 4 An earlier version of section 301 at
one time specifically listed an INS-style misappropriation action as
one that states were free to recognize or not as they pleased. 5 The
Justice Department objected that state protection would be inconsistent with the federal balance of incentive and free access. The
reference to misappropriation accordingly was stricken from section 301 during floor debates in the House, but only after a confusing exchange in which at least some members of Congress indicated that they thought they were not changing existing law or, by
5
virtue of the amendment, limiting the powers of the states.
The uncertain preemptive effect of section 301 has spawned
substantial academic commentary.5 7 On its face, section 301 appears to limit the ability of states to develop misappropriation doctrine in some directions, though perhaps not in others. Nevertheless, both the Seventh and Second Circuits have seemed willing to
decide in footnotes that section 301 does not limit the INS misappropriation doctrine at all.5 8
Federal preemption problems exist even apart from section
301. If protection is being asserted simply for the formulas used for
calculating the stock market indices, state courts may be preempted by federal patent law. A formula (or mathematical algorithm, as the Court typically calls it) is unpatentable if it is unconnected with any industrial process, and is unpatentable in any
event if it, like the S&P 500, is insufficiently novel or nonobvious.5 '
If an algorithm is unprotected under federal patent law, it is unlikely states can recognize property rights in such a mathematical
formula. Federal patent law does leave some role for state law, especially in the area of protecting trade secrets, 0 but states probably cannot grant property rights in an idea that patent law could

See 1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.01[B][2][b] (1982); Denicola, supra
note 43, at 517 n.7.
15 For discussions of § 301 and its legislative history, see Fetter, Copyright Revision
and the Preemption of State "Misappropriation"Law: A Study in Judicialand Congressional Interaction,27 COPYRIGHT L. SymP. (ASCAP) 1, 33-52 (1982); Goldstein, supra note
27, at 1110-23.
" See 122 CONG. REC. 32,015 (1976).
57 See, e.g., sources cited supra note 55.
8 See Roy Export Co. v. CBS, 672 F.2d 1095, 1106 n.19 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S.
Ct. 60 (1982); United States Trotting Ass'n v. Chicago Downs Ass'n, 655 F.2d 781, 785 n.6
(7th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
59 See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 186 (1981); see also 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-103 (1976).
60 See Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257 (1979); Kewanee Oil Co. v.
Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
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cover, but emphatically does not.6 1 The logic behind the Court's
interpretation of federal patent law-that it embodies the policy
that abstract formulas are too fundamental to be possessed by any
one exclusively 6 2 -points squarely towards preemption.
The preemption problem is ultimately inseparable from the
question of exactly what it is that the Commodity Exchange is appropriating from Standard & Poor's. The formula for calculating
the S&P index is more complicated than the one for calculating
the Dow Jones Industrial Average, but it is far from being so sophisticated or so novel that creating it required the expenditure of
significant amounts of time, labor, or money. Standard & Poor's
does not as much gather information as it rearranges and repackages the information that is generated by the stock market as a
whole. Standard & Poor's has to invest some effort in calculating
and updating its average, but it would be wrong to think this expenditure is very large or that the Commodity Exchange simply
wanted to avoid this expense. The Chicago Board of Trade was
equally interested in using the Dow Jones Industrial Average, and
updating it requires little more than a ticker-tape and a sixth3
grade education.
61 See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964); Compco Corp. v. DayBrite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
62 See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185-87 (1981).

"The Chicago Board of Trade was enjoined from using the Dow Jones Average by an
Illinois appellate court, again on the authority of INS. See Board of Trade v. Dow Jones &
Co., 108 ]M. App. 3d 681, 439 N.E.2d 526 (1982).
Of all major stock market indices, the Dow Jones Average of 30 Industrials is the most
primitive. For an analysis of the Dow Jones Industrial Average, see Rudd, The Revised Dow
Jones Industrial Average: New Wine in Old Bottles?, FIN. ANALYSTS J., Nov.-Dec. 1979, at
57. The Dow began in 1897 as the arithmetic average of 12 stocks. The sum of the price of
each of the stocks would be divided by 12. By 1928, the number of different companies
increased to 30, and since then the method of computing the average has not changed. See
J. LoRm & M. HAMILTON, supra note 52, at 60. To adjust the average to account for stock
splits, the divisor is recalibrated. The sum of the price of each of the 30 stocks is not divided
by 30, but rather by a number (which is now about 1.3) that reflects previous adjustments in
the average. A new divisor is chosen after each stock split by finding a new number that,
when divided into the sum of the price of all the stocks (including the new price for the
stock that split), produces the same number that the index had before the split. If, for
example, there were only two stocks in the index and each traded for 100, the divisor would
he 2 (because there are two stocks) and the index would be 100. If one stock split two for
one, the divisor would change. Since the sum of the stocks after the split (100 + 50 = 150)
divided by the new divisor must equal the old value of the index (100), the new divisor must
equal 1.5. A similar adjustment in the divisor is made when one of the firms in the average
is replaced by another. Substitutions are made, for example, when a represented company
files a petition in bankruptcy (as Manville did last summer) or when a company merges with
another. See Rudd, supra.
In contrast to the Dow, the S&P 500 seems quite elaborate. For a description of the
S&P 500, see J. Loam & M. HAMILTON, supra note 52, at 62. Standard & Poor's index
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Standard & Poor's might argue that the Commodity Exchange
is taking advantage of the effort it made to identify the 500 stocks
in its index. But Standard & Poor's has selected its stocks with the
aim of tracking the performance of stocks in various industries and
the performance of the stocks on the New York stock exchange as
a whole.6 4 Finding stocks whose fluctuations track those of a market, or groups within a market, is not difficult when past performance of all stocks is public knowledge. Creating an index of 500
stocks that would match the movement of the market as well as or
even better than the S&P 500 would not be especially difficult. In
fact, one would not do much worse if one simply picked the 500
most actively traded stocks, the stocks of the 500 companies with
the greatest shareholder equity, or, indeed, 500 stocks at random."'
In short, neither the sophistication of the formula, nor the cost of
updating the index, nor the difficulty of picking representative
stocks explains why the Commodity Exchange wanted to use Standard & Poor's index instead of its own.
The Commodity Exchange was willing to use disclaimers to
ensure that consumers were not misled into thinking that Standard & Poor's had lent its name to the futures market in its index. 6 Nevertheless, the Commodity Exchange may have wanted to
take advantage of the good will that Standard & Poor's had built
up over the years. If the Commodity Exchange were to create its

contains 500 stocks, rather than 30. To reflect stock splits and the like, the value of each
stock, rather than a common denominator, is changed. In addition, the importance of each
stock in the index turns on the total value of all the outstanding shares of the firm. Thus, a
change in the price of AT&T looms larger than a change in the price of Owens-Illinois,

because the total value of AT&T's shares is higher. (By contrast, a one-point rise in either
AT&T or Owens-Illinois has the same effect on the Dow.) Moreover, stock splits would have
no effect on the relative importance of stocks in the S&P 500.
The S&P 500 requires the gathering of more information than the Dow does. Standard
& Poor's must keep track of the stock splits, the stock dividends, and the mergers and
consolidations of 500 firms. It must multiply, add, and divide more numbers than Dow

Jones must to calculate its index, and the calculations (such as changes in the base values
for all the stocks in the index) are not as simple as determining the divisor for the Dow
Jones average. Nevertheless, once one has all of the necessary information, all of which is
publicly available, maintaining the S&P 500 is not difficult, and the techniques employed

are not particularly novel.
4 See Standard& Poor'sStock Price Indexes, in STANDARD & POOR'S STATIsTIcAL SERVIcE SECURITY PRICE INDEX REC. 130-39 (1982).

65 The price of shares of smaller companies is more volatile than that of the market as a
whole or of the S&P 500. Hence, a randomly chosen portfolio would probably be a worse
indicator of overall market performance than the S&P 500. Nevertheless, an index that took
account of the size of each company (as does the S&P 500) would minimize this effect, and

the index, although worse, might not be dramatically worse.
" Standard & Poor's Corp. v. Commodity Exch., Inc., 683 F.2d 704, 709 (2d Cir. 1982).
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own index, it would have to educate investors as to what its index
measured and how it fluctuated. Moreover, it would have to convince consumers that the index would be reliably calculated and
that technical adjustments made in it from time to time would not
work to their disadvantage. By using the S&P 500, the Commodity
Exchange could free ride on the good will and reputation for independence that the index has in the minds of the investing public.
The world would not necessarily be a worse place if Standard
& Poor's rights in the S&P 500 were recognized. Standard &
Poor's, in fact, had already licensed someone else to create a futures market in its index,67 and recognizing the rights would not
deprive the public of the opportunity to enter into such contracts.
Recognizing rights to the index, like recognizing any other rights,
has both benefits and costs. A futures contract is relatively more
expensive (and hence less attractive) if tribute is owed to Standard
& Poor's. In addition, the maker of an index may refuse to allow a
futures market in its index at all, as Dow Jones did. 8 On the other
hand, the amount of the tribute may be small relative to the size of
the transactions, and the barriers to creating one's own index are
not insuperable. Moreover, we may want to compensate the creators of an index for the costs of convincing the public of its
reliability.
This case, however, is different from INS in an important respect. INS wanted to use AP's news, not AP's name. It was the
gathering of the news that cost AP millions of dollars. The value of
the news was independent of AP's reputation for reliable
newsgathering. Indeed, INS never told its readers that it was using
AP's news.6 9 By contrast, the Commodity Exchange wants to use
the S&P 500 because of Standard & Poor's reputation. It would
probably not use this index if consumers did not make the link to
Standard & Poor's.
Standard & Poor's has invested a lot of resources in disseminating its index and convincing the public that it is a reliable measure of market performance. The question we have to face is
whether the Commodity Exchange should be able to free ride on
this investment of time, labor, and money. To this question, the
law of trademark and unfair competition may provide the common
law judge with a starting point, for that intellectual property re" Id.
u Board of Trade v. Dow Jones & Co., 108 IlM. App. 3d 681, 697, 439 N.E.2d 526, 537
(1982).
01 INS, 248 U.S. at 242.
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gime addresses the question of the extent to which a competitor
has a property interest in the reputation he has established in the
marketplace. Under traditional trademark and unfair competition
doctrine, competitors can always describe the goods they sell, even
if such descriptions involve the use of someone else's trademark. 0
A cause of action does not lie unless consumers are deceived.
Nothing prevents any company from duplicating Coca-Cola
and then telling the public that it produces a soft drink that is
identical to "the real thing," even though consumers may in fact
buy Coca-Cola or its exact equivalent only because years of advertising by Coca-Cola have convinced them that it tastes better than
other cola drinks.7 1 Telling consumers that one is creating a market in an index calculated like the S&P 500 is much like telling
consumers one is selling a beverage made like Coke. The principal
question a judge examining Standard & Poor's claim must ask is
whether there is in fact a flaw in traditional trademark doctrine or
in drawing an analogy to it.
CONCLUSION

Protecting Standard & Poor's does not follow lock-step from
recognizing the power of common law judges to discover intellectual property rights in the style of Justice Pitney. The major virtue
of allowing common law judges to discover intellectual property
rights in the tradition of INS may also be its major vice. Discovering new intellectual property rights forces a judge to confront and
reassess first principles. As in INS, a judge may not be forced to
choose decisively between a natural rights theory or an economic
incentive theory, but this is not to say that the balance is standardless or without subtlety. The common law judge reasons by
analogy, and when a new kind of intellectual property dispute confronts him, he must search for analogies in a legal universe that,
like all universes in which first principles dot the landscape, is so
primitive and so unformed that it is hard to identify clear
landmarks.
This problem is not one that has surfaced merely in the new
case of stock market indices. One of the most established of the
property rights derived from INS-the right of publicity-suffers
from a similar confusion. At times, a right of publicity is asserted
when what is at issue is a performance, such as a human can70 See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (1976).
71 See Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1968).
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nonball act, and the appropriate analogy is copyright. 2 At other
times, a right of publicity is asserted for the use of someone's name
or likeness in association with the sale of particular goods, such as
using a Guy Lombardo look-alike to sell Volkswagens, in which
7
case the appropriate analogy is the law of unfair competition.
These analogies do not necessarily resolve these cases nor are they
inevitably of equal value in common law intellectual property disputes. Nevertheless, identifying them may be more important than
deciding between natural rights and economic incentive theories of
intellectual property.

7 See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977); Note, Human
Cannonballs and the First Amendment: Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 30
STAN. L. Rav. 1185, 1186 n.7 (1978).
73 See Lombardo v. Doyle, Dane & Bernbach, Inc., 58 A.D.2d 620, 396 N.Y.S.2d 661
(1977).
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